{"id":12000,"date":"2026-08-18T13:01:33","date_gmt":"2026-08-18T10:01:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/commons.com.ua\/?p=12000"},"modified":"2026-08-18T13:01:35","modified_gmt":"2026-08-18T10:01:35","slug":"kreatyvna-kryza","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/commons.com.ua\/en\/kreatyvna-kryza\/","title":{"rendered":"Creative Crisis: Cultural Policy, Precarity, and European Integration"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Several important events have occurred in the Ukrainian culture sector in the last year. 2025 saw a revitalization<\/a> in the leadership of the Ministry of Culture, the launch<\/a> of the Ukraine Cultural Heritage Fund, and the most funding<\/a> since the start of the full-scale invasion for the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, while in April 2026 the Ministry of Culture, in collaboration with the Office of the President, launched<\/a> Tysiachnovesna, a content production program with a budget of \u20b44 billion. Additionally, in 2025 the Ukrainian government ratified<\/a> the 2030 Strategy for Cultural Development in Ukraine, a significant element of which is institutional reform<\/a> of cultural infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the start of the full-scale invasion, many in the culture sector frequently spoke about the extensive efforts of culture workers to evacuate museum collections and cultural heritage without support<\/a> from the relevant ministry. Ukrainian museum workers showed incredible dedication to their craft and saved thousands of relics, sometimes removing<\/a> and hiding<\/a> them while under shelling or occupation. However, now in the fifth year of full-scale war, fatigue and exhaustion are increasingly apparent, especially among workers in communal or state-run cultural institutions. After all, salaries in this sector remain<\/a> among the lowest in Ukraine, often only<\/a> \u20b46\u20138,000 post-tax.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this article, I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of culture policy in the EU and Ukraine, which is a task for a large analytical report. At the same time, I find it important to critically examine several aspects of how the culture sector\u2014and the discourse surrounding it\u2014functions, as I sense that this perspective is lacking in the Ukrainian culture sector. I trace the peculiarities of the development and transformation of culture policy in European countries and Ukraine with a focus on cultural infrastructure. I also reflect on precarity in the context of the latest key strategies and analytical reports and consider the specificities of social defense of culture workers in post-socialist European countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Ukrainian context: the 2030 Strategy and RES-POL<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The state\u2019s new 2030 Strategy for Cultural Development in Ukraine (hereafter, the Strategy for Cultural Development) proposes to view the culture sector as an element of national security and as a means of strengthening national identity and societal cohesion, a logical reaction to the external threat of Russian military aggression. It establishes four strategic goals: bolstering so-called \u201chuman capital,\u201d defending cultural heritage, enhancing the stability of the cultural system, and furthering international integration. The widespread use of the term \u201chuman capital\u201d effectively characterizes the general conceptual framework of Ukrainian culture policy, as this approach leads culture workers to economic resources and assets and reflects the utilitarian logic of neoliberal economics (Banks & Hesmondhalgh, 2009).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The process of Eurointegration in the culture sector was launched after Ukraine gained EU candidate status. One of the key components in this initiative was the project<\/a> Rapid Expert Support for Culture and Media Policies in Ukraine (hereafter, RES-POL). It was realized with financial support from the EU in 2023\u20132025 by the \u201cregional development\u201d center of PPV Economic Development Agency and engaged<\/a> many influential figures in the sector. RES-POL focused on art, culture, cultural heritage, creative industries, and media. As part of the project, experts analyzed cultural development, developed policy proposals, and conceived changes to several normative legal acts, some of which formed the basis<\/a> of the Strategy for Cultural Development. Reports published by the experts reproduce prevailing narratives regarding culture in the Ukrainian context, so I dedicate considerable attention to them in this article. However, before analyzing these results, I would like to explore the general development of culture policy in EU countries to map the broader context of how the sector functions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

European and Ukrainian culture policy: from welfare state to neoliberalism<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

After World War II, the governments of Western, Northern, and Central Europe actively rebuilt cultural infrastructure. Similarly, concurrent with the creation of the welfare state, these countries started to systematically formulate policy to develop cultural assets and expand access to them (Menger, 2010). First and foremost were measures aimed at supporting \u201chigh\u201d or \u201celite\u201d culture, which was seen as a universal good that needed to be protected from market forces (Dubois, 2019; Menger, 2010). The goal of these policies was to defend cultural heritage, support creative freedom within a market economy, democratize access to so-called \u201chigh culture\u201d like classical opera or experimental theatre, and apply the \u201carm\u2019s length principle\u201d1<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The \u201carm\u2019s length principle\u201d is based on the creation of special cultural institutions like artist councils to redistribute state funding for the culture sector in order to protect it from political influence. This is a distrinctive model of the British culture sector.<\/span> to manage cultural institutions and their self-government (Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2019). Post-war understanding of the culture sector, especially in Western countries like France and Great Britain, was based on a strict hierarchical juxtaposition of art and the mass commercial entertainment industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite various approaches to funding culture and managing the relevant infrastructure, researchers note a general tendency toward neoliberalization, or \u201cmarketization,\u201d of culture policy in many European countries since the 1980s (Alexander & Peterson Gilbert, 2023). European governments are increasingly viewing the culture sector as a strategic element in national and regional economies (Menger, 2010). This is accompanied by the instrumentalization of the sector: the need to support it is increasingly justified using social and economic values, including its contribution to employment and strengthening democracy, regional development, tourism, social cohesion, and international relations (Council of the European Union, 2018; McGuigan, 2004). Ultimately, culture is increasingly rarely seen as a value in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the concept of \u201ccreative industries,\u201d in which culture is equated to entrepreneurship and commercial viability, has emerged and been propagated in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In the 1990s, the government of the United Kingdom led by Tony Blair integrated the concepts of \u201ccreative industries\u201d and \u201ccreative economy\u201d into British culture policy. Scholars view this a watershed moment in the further neoliberalization of culture policy in European countries (Hesmondhalgh, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Tony Blair and Noel Gallagher of Oasis at the Cool Britannia party on July 30, 1997, following the Labour Party\u2019s victory in the general election. The term\u00a0Cool Britannia<\/em>\u00a0denotes a period in British culture while simultaneously symbolizing the institutionalization of the “creative industries” and their establishment within British cultural policy. Photo: Rebecca Naden<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In this context, the transition in Sweden from a culture policy of general welfare to a \u201ccreative economy\u201d neoliberal model is noteworthy (Strandberg, 2023). In the 1970s, while it was being formulated, one of the main goals of Swedish culture policy was defined<\/a> such that \u201csociety will assume the main responsibility of promoting diversity and expanding culture, as well as reducing or limiting the negative influence that the market economy might cause.\u201d The policy asserted that culture cannot be oriented toward market forces and profit and required protection in order to remain autonomous (Strandberg, 2023). This position came to be called the \u201cobjective of responsibility.\u201d Yet in 2009, the Swedish government removed the \u201cobjective of responsibility in the proposal<\/a> \u201cA Time for Culture,\u201d stating that \u201cthere is no contradiction between commercial forces and artistic quality or freedom.\u201d Eventually this meant replacing an approach in which the market was viewed as a threat to culture with one in which market forces were heralded as promoting creative freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The process of marketizing culture in Ukraine began somewhat later, at least since 1991. Yet today marketization forms and defines \u201cofficial\u201d narratives on culture. For example, the authors of the state\u2019s Strategy for Cultural Development propose, among other things, to view and evaluate culture based on its economic value, as one of their priorities is to \u201cdevelop creative industries and integrate culture and cultural heritage into the national economy.\u201d The authors note that \u201cculture is not seen as a segment of the economy that can yield profit.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Viewing culture as a sector that influences other areas of social life expands the possibility for social change. For example, the report<\/a> \u201cArts and culture in health and wellbeing and in the criminal justice system\u201d cites evidence of the fact that artistic practices help in combating depression and stress, supporting people with dementia, and overcoming loneliness. However, instrumentalizing culture and focusing on innovation, competition, and quantitative metrics forces cultural institutions to conform to market logic and limits their creative and critical potential (MacDowall et al., 2015; McGuigan, 2004; O\u2019Connor, 2016). Measuring effectiveness in the culture sector is not a neutral process, but a procedure that ultimately transforms cultural institutions under the logic of a market audit (MacDowall et al., 2015). Local managers of culture, including cultural institutions and civil society organizations, are forced to operate in conditions of regional competition for economic resources for the sake of improving the \u201cinvestment appeal\u201d of communities, which, once again, does not always work in the interest of the community and its residents (Miessner et al., 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Less commercially oriented institutions are being closed due to \u201cunprofitability\u201d and the demands of economic and political actors to \u201cmore effectively\u201d use the public space, as happened, for example, with the cult theaters Kinopanorama, Ukraina, and Kyiv in 2018-2019. Following their closure, the community did not receive additional economic resources but eventually lost important cultural centers that contained a space for critical expression, especially through the screening of experimental, festival, and noncommercial films. The logic of measurement and competition does not account for the fact that some cultural spaces and institutions are a societal good, the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of which is impossible to evaluate in principle and which must be defended from market logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Protest against the closure of the Kyiv Cinema on June 7, 2019 \u2014 the final day of its operation. Photo: Political Critique (Politychna Krytyka)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Grant financing, investment appeal, and the project approach: the economy of culture today<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Fundamental mechanisms of funding culture are also transformed in a neoliberal economy. As Jim McGuigan aptly summarizes in Rethinking Cultural Policy<\/em> (2004), there are three ideal subjects for neoliberal discourse, namely the \u201ctaxpayer,\u201d the \u201cshareholder,\u201d and the \u201ccustomer.\u201d McGuigan (2004) writes that \u201cthe taxpayer does not want his or her money wasted by government. The shareholder wants a return on investment. The customer wants choice and to be served well. His or Her Majesty the Customer, the mythical sovereign consumer, must be obeyed in market discourse (p. 44). These subjects also feature in the surrounding cultural discourse in Ukraine, for example, when it comes to justifying the reduction of funding for cultural institutions due to \u201cineffective\u201d use of taxpayer money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Culture Compass for Europe<\/a>, adopted in 2025, sets a strategic development framework for the European culture sector and its financing (the document itself talks more about investing) from 2028-2034 and intends to help the European culture sector \u201cthrive, innovate, and compete globally.\u201d It declares one of its main goals to be \u201can EU that draws on culture and cultural heritage to become more competitive, resilient and cohesive.\u201d The Culture Compass for Europe recommends collaboration between the public and private sectors, \u201ccomplementing grants with market instruments,\u201d and incorporating philanthropy and public-private partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conceptually, this is very similar to the theses of the Ukrainian Strategy for Cultural Development and the results of RES-POL. For example, the Strategy states that support mechanisms like patronage, sponsorship, and public-private partnership are insufficiently developed. In the Ukrainian context, developing legal mechanisms to diversify sources of income is an essential step in expanding the chance for cultural institutions to engage additional funding, especially for increasing salary funds. At the same time, even today one encounters the idea that in the Ukrainian culture sector, these instruments have always been auxiliary and cannot replace public financing, as hunting for and administering grant funding is an additional burden, especially for small crews, and can lead to burnout, even despite the fact that grants allow more ideas and institutional development to be realized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A characteristic feature of the neoliberalization of culture policy is its transition to project funding, specifically moving away from long-term unconditional support through the budgets of cultural institutions toward competitive short- or medium-term grants with defined final results, particularly within the cross-border Creative Europe Programme and other national or local programs (Scioldo, 2025). The ongoing Creative Europe Programme (2021\u20132027) and its priorities<\/a> for 2026 align funding culture with the wider economic and political goals of the EU: \u201cthe green and digital transitions and the strengthening of social and economic resilience.\u201d The Programme\u2019s goals include defending cultural diversity, yet its approach is entrepreneurial and market-oriented (Scioldo, 2025). Ukraine joined the Programme in 2016 and signed a new agreement on participating from 2021\u20132027 in December 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Undoubtedly, Ukraine\u2019s full-fledged access to the Creative Europe Programme will enable the development of the culture sector and expand support for it amid limited funding. This is especially appropriate during a full-scale war in which many budgets are being directed toward military needs. At the same time, it is important to have a space to criticize such instruments; for as many as the last 10 years, representatives of Culture Action Europe have been criticizing<\/a> the Creative Europe Programme for its focus on economic indicators and its restriction on participation for non-commercial organizations and grassroots initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When Ukraine becomes an EU member-state, it is highly likely that it will receive full-fledged access to EU funding for the culture sector. These funds could help to significantly modernize cultural infrastructure and to reconstruct and renovate damaged or destroyed institutions, as Ukrainian state and municipal budgets have always lacked funding for major repairs. These expenditures have been heavily restricted<\/a> during the full-scale war. Despite the undeniable advantages of this support, it is also worth considering existing criticisms of this model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) prioritizes<\/a> large-scale infrastructure projects like reconstruction or new large cultural centers, often without considering the long-term operating costs and cultural programs needed to sustain them. This fits into the general logic since the ERDF does not view supporting the capacity of the culture sector as a priority<\/a>, but as a means of achieving economic goals. Within this approach, supporting cultural infrastructure is seen as an investment that must be \u201creturned\u201d to the investor. The question arises as to the appropriateness of allocating public funds to large-scale cultural infrastructure projects, as these projects, among other things, increase social inequality, gentrify public spaces, and ultimately satisfy the interests of privileged middle-class city dwellers (Grodach, 2017).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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European Solidarity Centre in Gda\u0144sk, built with ERDF support. Photo: Ruukki Construction\u00a0<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

For now, it is difficult to predict whether Ukraine will eventually receive support from the EU to build cultural institutions. Yet in the context of future reform and the potential closure of many communal facilities in small communities, the issue of developing decentralized and accessible cultural infrastructure is becoming critical. There is hardly demand in Ukraine today for ambitious cultural projects that involve the building of new facilities. It is these initiatives<\/a>\u2014like the European Solidarity Centre in Gda\u0144sk2<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The project cost a total of 231 million z\u0142oty (around \u20ac53.3 million), of which the EU financed 113 million z\u0142oty (around \u20ac26 million).<\/span> and the National Polish Radio Symphony Orchestra (NOSPR) concert hall, the International Congress Centre, and the Silesian Museum in Katowice3<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The total funding for this project was around \u20ac231 million, of which the EU financed \u20ac123 million.<\/span>\u2014that the ERDF usually supports. Yet foreign funding could spur the building of a broader network of cultural institutions based on existing infrastructure. In the long term, this approach is more sustainable for developing an accessible culture sector since it does not overload local budgets with the operating costs of large new institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Examples of initiatives that are now developing such cultural infrastructure in Ukraine are community rebuilding<\/a> projects like Cedos and UMAEF and yeMistechko<\/a> under EVZ, which are restoring and developing existing cultural and public spaces in small communities. A disadvantage of these projects is the lack of additional institutional support for further development (besides additional and rather limited budget funding) once they have been realized. Without systemic financial support from the state and scaling to their communities, especially those with fewer resources to participate in such projects, these local initiatives risk becoming very pointed interventions. Ultimately, these projects will not have a tangible long-term impact on cultural infrastructure as a whole, but will only bolster existing regional inequalities in conditions where communities are forced to compete for resources, especially in the culture sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cKyiv not for sale\u201d or the privatization of culture<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

One of the signs of the neoliberalization of culture policy is the expansion of privatization, especially the transfer of management of cultural infrastructure and heritage to private foundations or non-government organizations. For now, there are limits in Ukraine on privatization of cultural heritage sites and the core network<\/a> of cultural institutions, unlike, for example, movie theaters, which were privatized beginning in the 1990s; most were eventually<\/a> closed, demolished, or repurposed. Privatization played a key role in the closure of the aforementioned Kinopanorama and Ukraine theaters in Kyiv, as local residents had far fewer ways to influence their fate. Dozens of other privatized movie theaters in Kyiv, including Zorianyi<\/a>, O. Dovzhenko<\/a>, and Aurora<\/a>, were eventually demolished and rebuilt into office, shopping, or residential complexes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Closed Kyiv Cinema featuring the “Kyiv not for sale” graffiti in 2024 \u2014 5 years after its closure. Photo: Olena Syrbu<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, several Ukrainian experts today, particularly as part of RES-POL, are proposing to expand<\/a> the list of cultural sites and heritage that are subject to privatization. The experts propose, among other things, to unblock the privatization of individual cultural institutions, museums, and theaters, and to allow damaged cultural sites and heritage to be privatized without competition and at a minimal symbolic price, for example, \u20b41.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some are doubting whether private owners will actually comply with their obligation to restore cultural heritage sites or to preserve their cultural function. Current legislative safeguards, as the previous experience of privatization shows, are clearly inadequate. Here one might recall the sensational case of the Sinnyi Market in Kyiv, which was sold<\/a> to private ownership for \u20b48 in 2004. The market was eventually demolished despite its historical and architectural value, and the Yaroslaviv Hrad apartment complex was built in its place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Zoryanyi movie theater in 2009. Photo: Otaman Zelenyi<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Another example is the modernist Zorianyi movie theater<\/a>, which was privatized in 2003 and demolished in 2019 under the pretext of reconstruction and transformation into a \u201cmodern, European-type cultural institution.\u201d The owners of the renovated Zorianyi cinema center\u2014\u201dthe art center of Kyivan life,\u201d as Kyiv City Council deputy Iaroslav Didenko called<\/a> it in 2018\u2014pledged to open four movie theaters, while its program was to be consist of festival and Ukrainian films. Yet eight years later, the only thing standing on the site of the former movie theater is the Zorianyi business center and the Sicily restaurant, while the only option for locals seeking festival and Ukrainian films is to go to Zhovten or KINO42 in Podil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The residential complex on the site of the historic market, like the business center on the site of the movie theater, embody the ideas of neoliberal urban governance in which city politicians prioritize economic development and engaging investment. According to this approach, cultural heritage is likewise seen through the prism of its economic value and its ability to generate profit. Although heritage sites might sometimes fit into this logic through a redefinition of their function\u2014like, for example, apartments<\/a> on former Dutch churches or restaurants<\/a> on the Arsenal factory in Kyiv\u2014this also often satisfies the interests of privileged urban dwellers. One can discuss the extent of adherence to the letter of the law, since the Sinnyi Market and the Zorianyi theater did not have a protected status when they were privatized and thus were not formally heritage sites protected by the law. Yet the lack of protected status does not mean that these buildings had no cultural value and were not important elements in the urban space; but time cannot be turned back, nor can Sinnyi or Zorianyi be restored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Office center on the site of the former Zoryanyi movie theater in 2020. Photo: Political Critique (Politychna Krytyka)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The precarity of culture work in the EU and Ukraine<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite shared neoliberal tendencies in culture policy, the question of social protection for culture workers and artists remains the order of the day in EU countries. It has gained particular relevance due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the European culture sector. According to data, culture workers in EU countries have more precarious working conditions than in other sectors, especially due to the prevalence of self-employment, short-term contracts, working multiple jobs, undeclared income, and low social protection4<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0See, for example, employment data in the culture sector on the official EU website, the report \u201cCharacteristics of employment and undeclared labor in the culture and creative sectors,\u201d and the challenges faced by artists and culture experts in Europe based on survey data by Creative Pulse.<\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The precarity of culture workers has been discussed in Western academia since at least the 2000s (Gill & Pratt, 2008). At least five years ago, it began to be discussed more actively in the Ukrainian public space. For example, in 2021 scholars<\/a> of working conditions in the culture sector and creative industries discussed precarity in research papers, in the zine<\/a> \u201c(un)just work,\u201d and on the podcast<\/a> \u201cCulture Work.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The text of the Strategy for Cultural Development does not mention the precarity of culture workers once, however the RES-POL report \u201cSignificant policy issues: art and culture\u201d allocates it to a separate category of issues5<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The report directly formulates an essential issue: \u201cSalaries in the sector are lower than the economic average. Working conditions are precarious. Staff lists and tariff scales in state institutions do not correspond to reality and make development impossible.\u201d The RES-POL experts recognize that \u201cartist professions are unattractive due to the instability of the sector and precarious working conditions,\u201d while salaries of culture workers remain ~30\u2009% lower than the economic average.<\/span>. Although the authors of the RES-POL report use the term \u201cprecarity\u201d rather descriptively, they lack a theoretical conceptualization and references, for example, to the works of Guy Standing (2011) on the \u201cprecariat\u201d or research on the specificity of creative work (Banks et al., 2013; Gill & Pratt, 2008; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011; McRobbie, 2016; Raunig et al., 2011), not to mention the phenomenon of \u201calgorithmic precarity\u201d in cultural work (Duffy, 2020)6<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The concept of algorithmic precarity, introduced by Brooke Erin Duffy, is related to the digitalization of culture work, its transition to digital platforms, and the instability which culture workers face due to the unforeseen and constantly changing algorithms of these platforms.<\/span>. One gets the impression that precarity is viewed more as an issue of remuneration rather than as a complex phenomenon that includes individualization, a lack of collective support, social insecurity, instability, and unpredictability of cultural work in the culture sector7<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The authors of the aforementioned RES-POL report assign the following problems to the category of \u201cPrecarity and imperfection of financial models\u201d: salaries lower than the economic average, uncompetitiveness of the culture sector on the labor market, competition between the public and private and international sectors, outdated staff lists and tariff scales, restrictions on commercializing activities in the public sector, a lack of medium- and long-term funding in the private sector, and the lack of a status of the artist or creative person. Additionally, the authors problematize \u201cthe impossibility of simplified taxation when selling your own artwork (of sole proprietors),\u201d the demand \u201cto reduce tax burdens to create independent cultural products,\u201d and the lack of \u201ctax holidays for the private sector and those in areas with active combat operations.\u201d<\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This list does not mention the social insecurity of individual culture workers, especially the \u201cfictitious self-employment\u201d\u2014when sole proprietors essentially fill the role of employees\u2014that is likely widespread in the Ukrainian culture sector. This situation increases precarity and limits access to mechanisms of social protection that are guaranteed by Ukrainian labor law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Estimates<\/a> show that 1.6\u2009% to 10.8\u2009% of culture workers in the EU are \u201cfictitiously self-employed\u201d; that is, they have the status of employees but are classified as self-employed. This reduces social protection for these workers since they are formally unemployed, yet labor law in European countries often assumes a lower level of social defense for self-employed people. Additionally, minimum salary standards usually do not extend<\/a> to self-employed culture workers. In general, culture workers in the EU are self-employed far more frequently than in other sectors8<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0According to the European Parliament resolution of November 21, 2023, the number of self-employed people in the culture sector and creative industries is over double the same figure in the general population: 32% compared to 14%.<\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2023, the European Parliament approved a resolution<\/a> with recommendations for an EU framing program for the social and professional position of artists and workers in the culture and creative sectors. The resolution calls for the creation of a legal basis for the EU to resolve issues of unstable working conditions in the culture sector. It claims that culture workers often do not have basic social protection and a just salary due to the atypical nature of their jobs9<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Atypical employment is a form of labor relations that differs from the model of full-time, regular, and permanent employment with a single employer. This includes, for example, part-time work, temporary work, or self-employment. Atypical employment is usually less protected and has worse benefits than, for example, employees that work on the basis of a labor contract. More on atypical employment can be found here: https:\/\/rev.org.ua\/en\/atypical-employment-brochure\/<\/a>.<\/span>. Paragraph 36 of the resolution highlights the importance of public financing for the culture sector, as well as the need to establish a minimum threshold for such financing at 2% of state expenditures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The resolution calls for establishing rules for a proper definition of employment status for culture workers and for combating \u201cfictitious self-employment\u201d such that workers can receive the social payments to which they have a right (paragraphs 16 and 28). It also focuses on adapting national social welfare systems to consider the periodic nature of culture work and guaranteeing that gaps in employment do not prevent access to medical insurance, unemployment aid, or pensions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contrary to the aforementioned trends toward strengthening social protection for cultural workers at the EU level, the authors of the RES-POL report and the Strategy for Cultural Development treat working conditions and social protection in the culture sector rather superficially. The authors of the RES-POL reports \u201cSignificant policy issues: art and culture\u201d and \u201cSignificant policy issues: creative industries\u201d almost never mention specific details for the culture sector regarding paid sick leave and vacation, pension provision, employment contracts, social insurance mechanisms for freelancers, and formalization of employment relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Work by Croatian artist Mladen Stilinovi\u0107, Artist at Work<\/em>, 1978. Photo: Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sof\u00eda <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Artist status and social protection: the experience of post-socialist countries<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In the context of Ukrainian Eurointegration, one can look to the experience of European countries regarding social protection in the culture sector. EU countries have various support mechanisms for culture workers. These include, for example, separate social security foundations like the K\u00fcnstlersozialkasse<\/a> in Germany or the K\u00fcnstler-Sozialversicherungsfonds<\/a> in Austria. One can dream that a special social security foundation for culture workers will exist in Ukraine someday, but it is unlikely in the near future. The most realistic outcome for Ukraine might be the experience of EU countries with a socialist past like the Baltic states and Poland, considering, of course, that their cultural policies are operating in the logic of peacetime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the fact that the general level and mechanisms of social protection for culture workers in these countries are less developed than in some of their Western European counterparts, there have been several initiatives to improve them over the last 15 years. This suggests that the market-oriented culture policies to which these countries and Ukraine turned in the 1990s do not protect culture workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2011, Lithuania has had a salary<\/a> for creative downtime for those who have an artist status. This salary is equal to the minimum wage (\u20ac1,153 in 2026), does not stipulate deductions, and can only be paid no more than three months in a year. In 2017, the government of Latvia adopted the Law<\/a> on the Status of Creative Persons and Professional Creative Organizations, which introduced the status of a creative person as a legal mechanism. One of the goals of the law is to support self-employed culture workers who do not receive a regular income or have temporarily lost the opportunity to work due to illness or unemployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the context of these initiatives in Lithuania and Latvia, it is appropriate to recall the status of the artist as a separate legal instrument, which plays a key role in the social protection of culture workers and self-employed ones in particular. The UNESCO Recommendations<\/a> on the Status of the Artist (1980) mention, among other things, living and working conditions for the artist, professional organizations, and labor unions. Additionally, the aforementioned resolution of the European Parliament of November 21, 2023, states the need to develop a common understanding of the status of the artist for EU countries. Scholars note<\/a> that legislation in EU countries on the status of the artist can help to define their status as professionals and to recognize the atypical nature of their work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Protest of French culture workers with “intermittent” status (intermittents du spectacle<\/em>) in 2023. Photo: Vincent Ferrier<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In several EU countries<\/a>, including Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Spain, those who work on short-term or irregular contracts in certain areas of the culture sector\u2014so-called \u201cintermittent workers\u201d\u2014have the same access as state employees to social security and unemployment aid in the absence of income. The legal introduction of the artist or creative person status allows<\/a> those with it to continue their professional activities while earning little income, or none temporarily, while still having the chance to receive additional support from the state, for example, when paying insurance premiums or as a stipend for creative downtime as in Lithuania and Latvia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine lacks the instruments to define the status of the artist or the culture worker. The only verification of this status is often that of a sole proprietor and the corresponding KVED like \u201cindividual artistic activity.\u201d However, this does not give culture workers the right to receive additional financial support if they are not earning income. At the same time, within RES-POL the status of the artist is considered rather as an additional mechanism to stimulate the economic activity of artists and to legalize their income, although developing a normative legal basis and an affirmation of this status in Ukraine could be a first step toward increasing the social protection of culture workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we return to the experience of post-socialist countries regarding socially oriented cultural policies, Poland, for example, has been working on legislation regarding social protection for artists and culture workers since 2018. The Law<\/a> on Professional Artists envisages financial support for low-income culture workers, creating a mechanism that guarantees constant social security and medical insurance for professional artists, and introducing the status of the artist. The Polish government plans to ratify this law in 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2004, the government of Estonia adopted<\/a> the Law on Creative Persons and Creative Associations, which recognized 17 creative unions as official partners of the state in providing social support and introduced at least six months of basic assistance for freelance artists equivalent to the minimum wage (\u20ac886 in 2025) with automatic medical insurance. In 2024, the state fund Cultural Endowment of Estonia introduced<\/a> a payment for creative work, the goal<\/a> of which is to provide social guarantees, especially the chance to receive medical insurance, to self-employed culture workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The experience of these countries suggests that market models to not work for many culture workers. Representatives of civil society and cultural institutions in the Baltic states are actively advocating<\/a> for \u201corganizing against precarity\u201d and bolstering mechanisms of social protection in the culture sector. For Ukraine, considering the experience of countries with a similar political history could be beneficial to evade their errors and to avoid increasing the vulnerability of already precarious culture workers, especially in the context of the full-scale war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusions<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As the data and research mentioned in the article suggest, culture policies in EU countries are not ideal. The economies of these countries dictate their own conditions, according to which cultural actors must eventually act and be forced to compete for limited resources. Yet despite the precarity and lack of protection that culture workers in the EU encounter, their social protection remains the focus of political attention. The 2023 European Parliament resolution and national legislative initiatives suggest that even with a market orientation, European countries are attempting to provide culture workers with dignified working conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, the recommendations of RES-POL and the prescriptions of the 2030 Strategy for Cultural Development, although addressing the issues of an obsolete tariff network and the need to modernize infrastructure, ultimately fail to adequately articulate the social dimension. I fear that as a result of long-awaited reform in cultural infrastructure, a situation could arise in which Ukraine will increase neoliberal funding mechanisms in the cultural sector while ignoring the social dimension that is an indispensable part of European culture policy. Moreover, weakening legislation on privatizing cultural sites could lead to stronger commercialization in Ukrainian cities, making spaces less accessible to most residents and provoking a new wave of demolishing cultural sites and heritage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Ukrainian cultural sector today functions in a reality of wartime, so it is important to account for the fact that many instruments of planning and funding culture are inaccessible, while external support, often critical for its survival, dictates its own conditions and rules. Yet this does not mean that one can ignore social support and protection for artists and culture workers while planning strategically. After all, even in EU countries, the number of critical voices regarding policy and strategy that define the precarity of life and labor for culture workers is growing every year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2030 Strategy for Cultural Development discusses, in particular, the lack of competence among culture workers to write grants and engage private funding. As part of future reforms of cultural infrastructure, these activities will most likely not be optional for communal cultural institutions, but mandatory, which will force them to work overtime to sustain the activity of their institutions. Ultimately, this could practically legalize the transfer of the state\u2019s administrative and financial responsibilities onto these workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Increased responsibility, and therefore freedom for culture workers, could promote the development of cultural infrastructure and the creative and critical potential of cultural institutions. But this requires responding to the questions of whether culture workers themselves are ensured dignified working conditions and whether \u201cgrant hunting\u201d\u2014and, as a consequence, overwork and burnout\u2014will be a “bonus” to the minimum wage. One would like to hope that this question will become a key<\/a> one for the revitalized Ministry of Culture of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

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Banks, M., Gill, R. C., & Taylor, S. (Eds.). (2013). Theorizing cultural work: Labour, continuity and change in the cultural and creative industries. Routledge. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.4324\/9780203519912<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Banks, M., & Hesmondhalgh, D. (2009). Looking for work in creative industries policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 15(4), 415\u2013430. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/10286630902923323<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Council of the European Union. (2018). Council conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019\u20132022. Official Journal of the European Union, C 460, 12\u201325. https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:52018XG1221(01)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dubois, V. (2019). Culture as a vocation: Sociology of career choices in cultural management. Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duffy, B. E. (2020). Algorithmic precarity in cultural work. Communication and the Public, 5(3\u20134), 103\u2013107. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/2057047320959855<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gill, R., & Pratt, A. C. (2008). In the social factory? Immaterial labour, precariousness and cultural work. Theory, Culture & Society, 25(7\u20138), 1\u201330. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0263276408097794<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Grodach, C. (2017). Urban cultural policy and creative city making. Cities, 68, 82\u201391. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cities.2017.05.015<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hesmondhalgh, D. (2018). The cultural industries (4th ed.). SAGE Publications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hesmondhalgh, D., & Baker, S. (2011). Creative labour: Media work in three cultural industries. Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

MacDowall, L., Badham, M., Blomkamp, E., & Dunphy, K. (Eds.). (2015). Making culture count: The politics of cultural measurement. Palgrave Macmillan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

McGuigan, J. (2004). Rethinking cultural policy. Open University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

McRobbie, A. (2016). Be creative: Making a living in the new culture industries. Polity Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Menger, P.-M. (2010). Cultural policies in Europe: From a state to a city-centered perspective on cultural generativity (GRIPS Discussion Paper No. 10\u201328). National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Miessner, M., Kallert, A., Naumann, M., & Belina, B. (2025). The neoliberal roots of regional embitterment: Reproducing \u2018left behind\u2019 places through inter-place competition. Territory, Politics, Governance. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/21622671.2025.2518312<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O\u2019Connor, J. (2016). After the creative industries: Why we need a cultural economy. Platform Papers, 47, 1\u201360.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Raunig, G., Ray, G., & Wuggenig, U. (2011). Critique of creativity: Precarity, subjectivity and resistance in the \u00abCreative industries\u00bb. MayFlyBooks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rius-Ulldemolins, J., Pizzi, A., & Rubio Arostegui, J. A. (2019). European models of cultural policy: Towards European convergence in public spending and cultural participation? Journal of European Integration, 41(8), 1045\u20131067. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/07036337.2019.1645844<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Critical analysis of the Culture Development Strategy 2030 and related European integration reforms<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1144,"featured_media":12010,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1308,1323,1],"tags":[],"coauthors":[1398],"class_list":["post-12000","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-mistetstvo","category-politika","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nCreative Crisis: Cultural Policy, Precarity, and European Integration - \u0421\u043f\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435 Commons<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/commons.com.ua\/en\/kreatyvna-kryza\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Creative Crisis: Cultural Policy, Precarity, and European Integration - 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